Responding
to an Emergency - An Interview with Bob Macpherson, CARE
by
Margaret S. Busé
In an interview
with the Journal, Bob Macpherson spoke candidly and honestly about the challenges,
successes and lessons learned in effectively responding to an emergency situation.
Macpherson is responsible for landmine safety and awareness and is the emergency
team leader for CARE. Throughout 1999, he has been in Kosovo coordinating
activities so that civilian lives can return to a state of normalcy. Upon
finishing our conversation, he was scheduled to fly to Chechnya to try to
coordinate relief efforts for that war-ravaged country.
Currently, the
Kosovo refugee crisis and the current Chechnya war are vying for first place
for the worst humanitarian disaster in Europe since World War II. From March
24, 1999, when NATO began bombing Yugoslavia, until June 10, 1999, when a
peace agreement was signed between the Yugoslav government and NATO, more
than 1 million ethnic Albanian refugees fled the province of Kosovo. The refugees,
many of whom were forced from their homes at gunpoint, crossed over into neighboring
Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hundreds of thousands
more were internally displaced within Kosovo's borders.
 |
Building
on its existing presence in the Balkans, CARE launched an immediate emergency
response, eventually managing eight refugee camps in Albania and Macedonia
housing over 100,000 refugees. CARE had been working in the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia since 1993 helping displaced Serb refugees from Bosnia,
and in Kosovo. Since 1998 they have been implementing shelter provision
and repair, agricultural rehabilitation and mine-awareness training and
demining. CARE re-entered Kosovo three days after the first NATO troops
and is now working in the Urosevac (known as Ferizaj in Albanian), Kacanik,
Lipljan and Mitrovica areas. Over 810,000 refugees have returned to Kosovo
from neighboring Albania and Macedonia and other countries. More than
20,000 refugees remain in Macedonia and 4,030 refugees remain in Albania. |
}
How long have you been involved with relief efforts in Yugoslavia?
BM: Since 1994
I have spent much of my time going back and forth, first from Bosnia and then
I got involved with Kosovo in the first part of November 1998.
}
What were your predominant activities in Bosnia?
BM: It was totally
emergency relief and shelter. It was interesting how things evolved in Bosnia
and how by 1994/1995 there were so few strikes in the NGO community and then
there was a whole sale rush into Bosnia with mine action and mine awareness.
}
In Kosovo have you done mine awareness and demining?
BM: I am most
proud of Kosovo. We do some mine awareness, but predominantly mine action
in Kosovo. We use MINETECH and right now we have four teams and that in essence
is eight men and two dogs per team. We work generally a corridor from Mitzuvesha
to the north to Versia and Urosovich to the south.
}
What did you run into in Kosovo that you had not encountered before?
BM: Easily it
was the preponderance of cluster bombs and the sophistication of the NATO
weapons. In essence we came in three days after NATO; I had MINETECH on the
ground four days after that. One thing I have a lot of pride in is that in
Kosovo we took the lessons that we watched other NGOs and other organizations
do and applied them. I call it an integrated process and this is by no means
a unique or innovative concept, it is just right. What we did right from the
beginning is that we focused on shelter. We focused on agriculture and some
health, but in the beginning it was shelter. If you could just draw those
three areas in a vertical bar. Underneath of that foundation I put mine action
and mine awareness because particular in the shelter area going into the remote
areas of the country that had been beat up pretty well, having that mine-assessment
team right there with that shelter-assessment team paid us dividends that
were off the page. We also employed an emergency explosive ordnance demolition
team. So that is how we worked the immediate problems: through an integrated
approach. Just by the fact of who you work for, you can show off a lot of
times. You can have all the mine-awareness education, but people want to say
`Thank you very much, we understand the problem but we have a problem right
here that we need help with. What can you do for us today-this second?' This
integrated approach has worked real well for us and the communities we are
trying to help.
}
What type of information could you or your organization have benefited from
before you deployed there?
BM: About as
much geographic information system (GIS) services as is possible. I really
am big on this. If I could have gone to one central repository and said `OK,
lets look at this province from a geographic information point of view. Where
are locations for industrial capabilities, agricultural capabilities? Where
is the preponderance of forests?' Forests became a big thing to us for wood
and shelter, and then to try to determine where the known mine fields were.
To put all of this information together would have been a tremendous help.
The shame of it is is that information is out there. It is a matter of us
sitting down and for us to have that coordinating mechanism. On a positive
side, I have never experienced this before; the U.S. State Department deployed
their GIS capability into the field. That was an enormous benefit to us.
}
How successful was integrating information with the other NGOs operating in
the field?
BM: I have never
had a problem. It may be because of the tightness of the community. Organizations
that I traditionally work quite well with are the ICRC, NPA and Handicap International.
We bump into each other quite a bit and I have an enormous respect for those
organizations' survivor and victim assistance programs, something we don't
do. I go looking for these fellows. HALO, Greenfields, MAG, the cast of thousands-we
all work well together. I may have disagreed with them now and again, but
I have never bumped into the competitiveness that some talk about.
}
There was quite a media blitz involved in Kosovo. Did that help or hurt you
and your organization?
BM: In my case
it is still costing me half a million dollars a month to fund activities.
Actually it just went to five hundred and fifty thousand and the reality is
as long as it is positive it helps to focus the public's attention. Media
exposure is helpful. The media sensitizes the donor community to the magnitude
of the problem. I get a little concerned sometimes because I think that the
Campaign to Ban Landmines, the Nobel Peace Prize, Princess Dianathe
reality is now is the time to dig them out from a euphemistic point because
it is tough to raise money. I get frustrated. There is an integrated capacity
to mine action going on with each of CARE's programs and that is very important
when you are as large as CARE is. I am a strong believer in mine awareness,
but I think that the NGO community has to be involved from the mine action
side.
}
In the actual demining?
BM: Yes. The
problem I have with the State Department is they just gave a $250 million
contract to RONCO over a five-year period. They feel they have worked real
well for them on the DOD side and therefore this is a good expenditure for
their funds. What they cannot do, which would have been a tremendous help.
The shame of it is is that information is out there. It is a matter of us
sitting down and for us to have that coordinating mechanism. On a positive
side, I have never experienced this before; the U.S. State Department deployed
their GIS capability into the field. That was an enormous benefit to us.
}
So, you think it would benefit more NGOs to get involved in the actual demining
because right now, most aren't involved?
BM: This is obviously
something that if you're going to do it, you better do it all the way. So
if you are going to commit
That is the only reservation I have. Sure
I would like to see dozens of NGOs out there as long as they are committed
professionals and they know what they are doing. Seventy percent of what we
do has to be based on the integration within the mine action community and
if you want to do this and go at it alone you might as well not bother. Look
at the results of an unprofessional approachthis is not something that
we can fool around with.
}
Do the NGOs share information well?
BM: The organizations
I work with are very professional. If I ask a question of one of them the
answer comes back very quickly. I can call my contacts 24 hours a day and
I will get an answer.
}
You have mentioned the mine initiatives and working with an integrated mine
action program. Is that the KIMAP (Kosovo Integrated Mine Action Program)
that I saw mentioned?
BM: In essence
I was writing that on the fly. That goes way back. That was a program that
I first put together looking for funding for mine awareness and mine action,
which I put to the United Nations. What eventually had to happen was I had
to break it down into two separate components and seek funding separately
for mine action and mine awareness. I just finished working on today the Kosovo
Mine Awareness Project, which is going to the BPRM. What happened in the very
beginning, the people who really came to the rescue were the Canadian and
British governments for funding mine awareness and mine action. I need funding
for the next six months. This program will be submitted to the Bureau of Population
and Refugees in Washington for mine awareness.
}
What type of time frame does it take to get a mine-awareness program off the
ground when you have refugees returning?
BM: I will answer
that in two ways. In Kosovo it wasn't as hard because a lot of other NGOs
had done mine awareness in the camps in Macedonia and Albania. To do it right
it is going to take two or three weeks to get the right guy. It depends if
it is a crisis, but to get the right guys in there to set the thing up is
the trick. I am thinking about Albania where we had a dead start. We had a
man and woman finally come in and that took two weeks and they were skilled
at mine education.
}
Were you the initiator for the integrated approach to mine action?
BM: Yes, and
I got funding from Great Britain's DEC. Now thanks to the U.S Department of
State's Humanitarian Demining unit that lead us to the International Trust
Fund. We are in essence getting two for one for the money. The drum I keep
hammering is what I have already put forth. I am not going to come to Kosovo
and run down this road and start destroying mines and have health, agriculture
and shelter going on separately. Sometimes it is just as effective to tell
people where the mines are not. I am trying to sell this as an integrative
process-awareness, mine action, health, agriculture, shelter.
}
With this integrated approach, who determines the priority of areas to be
demined?
BM: If you look
at the map of Kosovo the 450 documented mine fields that the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia forces turned over to NATO, we had 200 plus in our area. We
worked, as all of us did with UNMACC, to work with the coordination of where
we were going to position our assets. We finally got some help from MAG and
Greenfield in our area.
}
What are the successes of CARE's programs in Kosovo?
BM: Just in the
month of September 1999, we cleared 3,068 houses in our area.
}
What does that mean?
BM: That goes
back to the shelter requirement, helping people get out of the cold for winter.
It means when we had our shelter coordinators moving through an area before
they could even go in a house to begin making their assessment, dogs went
through those homes to clear them. We had agricultural sights cleared. Dangerous
areas confirmed were 31 villages-now that can be one acre or 100. Schools
cleared were two. Kilometers of road cleared, 12. Water lines cleared, 54
km. That gives you an idea. This was the first time CARE was on the ground
from the beginning. We took some of the lessons learned in other places and
from what other NGO's have told us.
}
How did you come about being so well prepared this time?
BM: We spent
November through March out there. I never thought it would come to bombing,
but I watched this war being fought by the KLA and the Federal Republic forces.
At that time UNICEF and CARE were going to implement a Kosovo wide mine-awareness
program in April, just before the kids got out of school. I was really tuned
into the existing problem of UXO before the bombing started and because of
my previous experience in Bosnia, I knew that the Serb army was pretty good
about documenting landmines but the splinter militias were tough. I spent
25 years as an U. S. Marine officer and I know for planning purposes that
10-15 percent of all munitions that are dropped are planned for malfunctioning.
You didn't have to be too smart to put all those figures together. That is
where my preparation came from.
}
Where do you see the future of CARE's programs in Kosovo?
BM: CARE will
be there for the long run for mine action and mine awareness.
}
When will some type of return to normalcy occur?
BM: This is my
opinion: I believe it is contingent on getting people through this winter
with adequate shelter and then getting a decent crop planted in the Spring
of 2000. Stabilize the population for this winter. For spring, summer and
fall it will be major infrastructure assistance and getting crops in the ground
at the same time.
}
Do you think enough land has been cleared for that?
BM: I don't think
the landmine problem was nearly as bad as the UXO problem. While I was still
out there the U.S. government declassified documents that showed where they
dropped the clusters.
}
How much of the agriculture and livestock were damaged by the war?
BM: If you could
find a cow out there you were lucky. The problem was farmers were so anxious
to cultivate their crops they were out there before areas had been cleared.
}
What are your future activities?
BM: I will probably
be headed to the Caucasus by the English Republic to look at the situation
with refugees coming out of Chechnya. I coordinate emergency response and
landmine integration. With 250,000 refugees down in the Caucasus that is something
we need to look at. I tell you, you can't monitor things from Atlanta, Georgia
you have to be there on the ground.
}
There are not a lot of NGOs operating there.
BM: It is tough
to get to there and it is quite a dangerous area and that is part of what
I am going down there to look at. I am heading out there to see what CARE
can do for the people there.
}
How do you get your job done amid all the hardship the people are encountering?
BM: I am certainly
moved by the hardship and I am a compassionate person, but when it comes to
getting relief and emergency supplies out you have to stay apolitical, and
I can't let my mind start thinking about who did what to whom. It is like
going into combat in the U.S. Marines. I was an infantry officer and I started
in the Vietnam War; if you let your emotions take over that is when you get
people hurt.
Contact
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Tel: 1-800-521-CARE,
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