Landmines/Explosive Remnants of War and the War on Terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
by Ayman Sorour [ Protection of Armaments and Consequences ]
This article looks at the relationship between the existing landmine and explosive remnants of war1 problem in the Middle East and North Africa, and terrorist activities in the area by explaining the scope of the mine/ERW problem in the region; the huge availability of explosives for use in illegal activities, particularly terrorism; and the case of Algeria and Egypt being affected by recent terrorist acts.
The Middle East and North Africa region is affected by mines/ERW because of the many wars and conflicts this region witnessed since the 1940s through today. Historically and geographically, the mine/ERW problem began in MENA around the end of World War II in North Africa, and continued through the invasion of Iraq by Coalition Forces in 2003. In addition, a number of internal conflicts and wars have resulted in contamination. These internal conflicts have taken place in: Oman (1964-1975), Lebanon (1975-1990), Yemen (1994) and Algeria (1991-present). Securing borders and strategic locations are other reasons for existing mines in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Libya, Tunisia, Syria, Yemen, Jordan and maybe other countries.
Tons of Explosives Available for Use
There are 15 affected countries and territories in MENA contaminated with millions of mines and ERW. Some of those countries have declared the numbers of mines and ERW in their lands, though others have not as they do not know how many remain. All affected countries, however, have projections based on estimated affected land and previous demining operations.
Regional projections vary greatly, totaling 52-66 million mines and ERW. The estimated contaminations of each country are as follows:
- Algeria: 2,783,555
- Egypt: 21,600,000 (only 20-25 percent are mines)
- Iran: 12-16 million
- Iraq: 8-12 million before the 2003 Coalition invasion, which surely increased those numbers
- Israel: 260,000, emplanted by Israel for security reasons
- Jordan: 203,000
- Kuwait: small number after clearance of 5-7 million
- Lebanon: 406,000 mines and 4 million ERW, the majority of which are cluster munitions left after the last Israeli conflict with Hezbollah/Lebanon in July and August 2006
- Libya: 1.5-3 million
- Syria: 500,000
- Tunisia: 3,240 mines and an unknown number of ERW
- Yemen: 150,000 to 2 million
In Oman, Palestine and Western Sahara, the numbers of mines and ERW are unknown.
Given the fact that the aforementioned mines and ERW differ in type and composition, the amount of live explosives they contain differs, too. On average, we can estimate the live explosives at 0.25 grams (0.88 ounces) per item,2 which means the quantity of available live explosives in MENA is between 13,151 and 16,489 metric tons (16,229 U.S. tons). These explosives are not secured and cannot be secured due to the fact that the large part of lands where they are found not easily accessible for political reasons, as in Iraq, or because no survey has been completed, as in Algeria, Egypt and Libya.
The first question that may come to mind is: how easy is it to clear such
mines and ERW, considering the very low level of practical experience of
those who do it. The answer is that it is undoubtedly risky and dangerous
work, but in some affected countries, mines and ERW can be found on the
land's surface, like the way the Iraqi Army planted landmines in Kuwait.
Previous munitions stores and abandoned arms caches, such as the many the
Iraqi Army left behind after the initial Coalition Forces invasion in 2003,
are also obvious locations. In other places, locals may have little
experience to (help them clear mines and ERW. For instance, Explosives for Free and Illegal Activities It's not known when explosives from mines and ERW were first
used in illegal activities, but it is not a recent occurrence.
Explosives from mines and ERW have historically been used in
fishing and mining operations, providing a cheap and easy method
for both activities. Some Bedouins in remote areas use these
explosives to secure their private properties from thieves or to
secure their drug plants from others, including police forces. Since 2003, explosives from mines and ERW have been used in
terrorist acts in MENA. In Iraq, a 2003 attack against the
United Nations headquarters in Baghdad resulted in the death of
the U.N. envoy to Iraq and the death and injury of more than a
dozen others. This terrorist attack was one of the biggest uses
of that type of explosive; this use of explosives continues in
Iraq. Similar terrorist acts occurred in Sinai, Egypt, in
October 2004, July 2005 and in April 2006. The government
admitted that explosives in those terrorist acts were taken from
mines and ERW. Although the Algerian government did not announce
the origin of explosives used by the two car bombers in April
2007 who attacked the government building and police station in
Algiers, and a suicide car bomber in Lakhdaria (80 kilometres
[50 miles] from Algiers), explosives may have come from
mines/ERW. Recently in Yemen, the government warned the
Al-Houthi group and its followers about using landmines in their
ongoing conflict against government forces in the governorate of
Sa'Ada in northern Yemen. In all MENA countries, possession of explosives in any form
or type without permission from the authority (the army or the
police) is prohibited. Violation of such laws could cost the
guilty person his life or require that he spend the rest of his
life in jail. However, this appears not to be a deterrent to the
violators. The Case of Egypt Egypt is affected by 21.6 million mines and ERW in the
western area of the country because of WWII and the
Israeli-Egyptian wars in Sinai and the Red Sea area. Because 75
to 80 percent of this number is ERW, explosives comprising those
mines and ERW are estimated at 5,400 metric tons (5,315 U.S
tons). Most affected areas in Egypt are not marked or fenced
because old fences have been stolen or have disappeared due to
either climate conditions or carelessness by officials; yet in
most affected areas, local people, who in some areas are
Bedouin, know quite well the affected or suspected areas. They
gained this knowledge by living with mines and ERW for many
years and from the many accidents that happened to their
families or animals. In October 2004, four explosions that targeted three tourist sites in
Taba and Dahab in Sinai, 450 kilometres (280 miles) east of Cairo, resulted
in the death and injury of more than 150 persons. In July 2005, two
explosions targeted a tourist site and parking nearby in Sharm el-Sheikh,
South Sinai, and resulted in the death and injury of more than 300 persons.
In April 2006, five explosions, three of them targeting the tourist area of
Dahab, Sinai, resulted in the death and injury of more than 100 persons. The
two other explosions targeted the multinational force in the El-Goura area,
although there were no casualties. According to the Egyptian Ministry of
Interior, explosives used in these explosions were taken from mines and ERW
in Sinai. In 2006, there were many reports on the transfer and
stockpiling of landmines and explosive remnants of war by
individuals. In May 2006, a farmer in Ismailia, located 120
kilometers (75 miles) northwest of Cairo, found 210 pieces of
unexploded ordnance and 4,000 bullets on his land while he was
preparing it for cultivation. The same month, the police forces
found 20 active landmines among packages of TNT in a cave in
Risan Mountain on the Sinai Peninsula. In June 2006, police
forces found pieces of unexploded ordnance–such as airdropped
bombs, ordnance and artillery shells–in the Al-khutmiyah area.
In October 2006, the police arrested a scrap dealer in Al-Arish
city of North Sinai for possessing 64 landmines. The man said he
used to clear landmines himself, remove the explosives and sell
the metal from the landmines. The difficult experience Egypt has
faced in Sinai from terrorist acts using explosives from mines
and ERW, and the possible use of such explosives again,
highlights the need to study the situation carefully. The Case of Algeria Algeria is affected by 2,783,555 mines and ERW on its borders
with Tunisia in the east and Morocco in the west.2
This contamination results from the colonial era and ongoing
fighting with terrorist groups, mainly the Salafist Group for
Jihad, which recently joined Al-Qaeda and renamed itself
"Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb Countries." The
estimated explosives in mines and ERW in Algeria amount to 696
metric tons (685 U.S. tons). Many affected areas in Algeria are
not marked or fenced as old fences have been stolen or have
disappeared either because of climate conditions or because of
official carelessness. Terrorist groups in Algeria have used
landmines and improvised explosives devices against security
forces since the early 1990s. In August 2006, 31 military
persons were injured because terrorist groups planted landmines
and booby traps in the Boumhani forest in east El-Bouira
governorate, East Algiers, when security forces were following
them. In October 2006, three soldiers were killed and another 15
injured in a similar operation in Béjaïa governorate. In April
2007, two explosions, one of them targeting the government
palace in Center Algiers and the other targeting a police
station in East Algiers, resulted in the death and injury of
more than 160 persons. In July 2007, an explosion targeting a
military base in Al-Akhdaria area, Bouira governorate, resulted
in the death and injury of more than 30 military personnel.
Although authorities did not announce or confirm that explosives
used in those acts came from mines or ERW, the fact that the
terrorist group in Algeria is part of Al-Qaeda, which uses the
same methods in Iraq, and that the source of explosives used is
unknown, indicates a high possibility that recovered mine and
ERW explosives were used. Additionally, the police arrested a small group of criminals with 188
French APID51 mines3 they had removed from old minefields to use
in fishing. In July 2007, the police force of Tlemcen in West Algeria
arrested a criminal group of eight for transferring and stockpiling
anti-personnel mines. The criminal group would remove anti-personnel mines
from the mined area of Ain-El-Safra, El-Na'ama governorate, and transfer
them to the Salam Belashash area, near the border with Morocco, to remove
TNT and then sell it. The authority arrested part of the group while they
were transferring 100 APMs, and then found another 289 APMs cached in
Ain-El-Safra. Conclusion Analyzing the similarities between terrorist attacks in Egypt
and Algeria will clarify the connection between terrorist groups
in both countries, reflected in these groups' usage of recovered
landmines and ERW in suicide-bomber cars as well as a common
membership in Al-Qaeda The huge amounts of explosives available
from mines and ERW throughout MENA, and confirmed and suspected
use in previous terrorist acts, should alarm us. Officials are
encouraged to study such relations carefully and be ready to
deal with them, particularly in the absence of any mine-action
programs in these countries. Biography Contact Information Ayman Sorour
65 Nober St Endnotes References
Algerian anti-personnel mines before being destroyed as part
of stockpile destruction, Hasi Bahbah, South Algeria, May 2005. Photo
courtesy of author
Ayman
Sorour is the Executive Director of Protection of
Armaments & Consequences (PROTECTION), an international NGO that
focuses on banning arms that affect civilians during and after
war, banning weapons of mass destruction, applying international
law and international humanitarian law, and helping victims of
arms in the Middle East and North Africa. He is also a
Landmine Monitor researcher for North Africa and an
International Campaign to Ban Landmines management committee
member. He is a 2005 graduate of the United Nations Development
Programme Senior Managers Course presented by the Mine Action
Information Center at James Madison University. Sorour holds a
Bachelor of Arts in law from Cairo University.
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